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In natural behavior, visual information is actively sampled
from the environment by a sequence of gaze changes.
The timing and choice of gaze targets, and the accompa-
nying attentional shifts, are intimately linked with ongoing
behavior. Nonetheless, modeling of the deployment of
these fixations has been very difficult because they
depend on characterizing the underlying task structure.
Recently, advances in eye tracking during natural vision,
together with the development of probabilistic modeling
techniques, have provided insight into how the cognitive
agenda might be included in the specification of fixations.
These techniques take advantage of the decomposition of
complex behaviors into modular components. A particular
subset of these models casts the role of fixation as that of
providing task-relevant information that is rewarding
to the agent, with fixation being selected on the basis of
expected reward and uncertainty about environmental
state. We review this work here and describe how specific
examples can reveal general principles in gaze control.
Human vision gathers information in complex, noisy, dy-
namic environments to accomplish tasks in the world.
In the context of everyday visually guided behavior, such
as walking, humans must accomplish a variety of goals,
such as controlling direction, avoiding obstacles, and taking
note of their surroundings. They must manage competing
demands for vision by selecting the necessary information
from the environment at the appropriate time, through con-
trol of gaze. How is this done, apparently so effortlessly,
yet so reliably? What kind of a control structure is robust in
the face of the varying nature of the visual world, allowing
us to achieve our goals? While the underlying oculomotor
neural circuitry has been intensively studied and is quite
well understood, we do not have much understanding of
how something becomes a target in the first place [1].
It has long been recognized that the current behavioral
goals of the observer play a central role in target selection
[2–4]; however, obtaining a detailed understanding of exactly
how gaze targets are chosen on the basis of cognitive state
has proved very difficult. One reason was that, until recently,
it has been difficult to measure eye movements in active
behavior, so the experimental situations that were examined
typically involved fixing the subject’s head and measuring
gaze on a computer monitor. Within this tradition it was
natural first to consider how stimulus features such as
high contrast or color might attract gaze. Formalizing this
approach, Koch and Ullman [5] introduced the concept of
a saliency map that defined possible gaze points as regions
with visual features that differed from the local surround.
For example, a red spot on a green background is highly
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defined saliency or conspicuity is modulated by behavioral
goals, or top-down factors, to determine the priority of
potential gaze points.
Consequently, in later models of salience (or priority) the
stimulus saliency computations were weighted by factors
that reflected likely gaze locations, such as sidewalks
or horizontal surfaces, or introduced a specific task such
as searching for a particular object [6,7]. These models
reflected the consensus that saccadic target selection is
determined by activity in a neural priority map of some kind
in areas such as the lateral intra-parietal cortex and frontal
eye fields [8–10]. This kind of modeling has a critical limi-
tation, however, in that it applies to situations where the sub-
ject inspects a static image on a computer monitor, and
this situation does not make the same demands on vision
that are made in the context of active behavior, where visual
information is used to inform ongoing actions [11]. While
there have been successful attempts to model specific
behaviors such as reading or visual search, we need to
develop a general understanding of how the priority map
actively transitions from one target to the next as behavior
evolves in time.
The use of a computer monitor was typically imposed by
the limitation of eye tracking methodology, which required
that the subject’s head be in a fixed position. This limitation
was removed, however, when Land [12] developed a simple
head-mounted eye tracker that allowed observation of
human gaze behavior in the context of everyday tasks. This
development provided a more fertile empirical base for
understanding how gaze is used to gather information to
guide behavior. In the subsequent decades, improvements
in eye tracking methodology have allowed a wide variety of
natural visually guided behavior to be explored [11,13,14].
While these observations have provided very clear evidence
for the control of gaze by the current cognitive agenda, a sec-
ond critical roadblock has been the difficulty in developing
a deeper theoretical understanding of how this agenda
determines changes of gaze from one target to the next,
given the inherent complexity of interactions with the world
in the course of natural behavior. It is these gaze transitions
that are hard to capture in standard experimental paradigms,
and the problem that we address here is how to capture the
underlying principles that control them.
The challenge of modeling tasks is at first blush intrac-
table, given the diversity and complexity of visually guided
behavior. Observations of gaze control in natural behavior,
however, suggest a potential simplifying assumption,
namely, that complex behavior can be broken down into
simpler sub-tasks, or modules, that operate independently
of each other, and thus must be attended to separately.
For example, in walking, heading towards a goal and avoid-
ing obstacles might be two such sub-tasks. The gaze control
problem then reduces to one of choosing which sub-task
should be attended at any moment; for example, whether
to look towards the goal or to look for obstacles. In both
these cases, gaze is taken as an indicator of the current
attentional focus for subtask computation. Gaze and atten-
tion are very tightly linked [15,16] and there is now a sig-
nificant body of work on natural gaze control suggesting
that gaze is a good, although imperfect, indicator of the
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R623current attentional computation. Subjects sequentially
interrogate the visual image for highly specific, task-relevant
information, and use that information selectively to accom-
plish a particular sub-task [17–19]. In this conceptualization,
vision is seen as fundamentally sequential. Thus, gazing at
a location on the path aheadmight allow calculation of either
the current walking direction or the location of an obstacle
relative to the body, but it is assumed that these compu-
tations are sequential rather than simultaneous, given that
both are attentionally demanding.
While the assumption of independent sub-tasks is almost
certainly an oversimplification, it is a useful first step, as it
is consistent with a body of classic work on a central atten-
tional bottleneck that limits simultaneous performance of
multiple tasks (for example [20,21]). For the most part, a
new visual computation will involve a shift in gaze. This is
not always true, for example, when spatially global visual
information is needed, or when peripheral acuity is good
enough to provide the necessary information without a
gaze shift; however, it is valid for many instances, and it is
those cases we focus on here.
In this minireview, we shall describe models of gaze
control that use the simplification of modules in two different
but closely related contexts. In the first situation, we con-
sider the problem of how to allocate attention, and hence
gaze, to different but simultaneously active behavioral goals.
In driving a car, simultaneously active goals might be to
follow a lead car while obeying a speed limit and staying in
the lane. Here, the challenge for gaze is to be in the right
place at the right time, when the environment is somewhat
unpredictable. This setting deals with the problem of compe-
tition between potential actions and has been labeled ‘‘the
scheduling problem’’ [22]. The second situation tackles the
problem of structuring elaborate behavioral sequences
from elemental components. We consider a sequential
task, such as making a sandwich, where gaze is used to pro-
vide information for an extended sequence of actions. The
question asked is: given gaze location and hand movement
information of a subject in the process ofmaking a sandwich,
can we determine the stage in the construction they are
currently working on? It turns out that a probabilistic model,
termed a dynamic Bayes network [23], provides sufficient
information to identify each task stage. Thus, the observed
data are used to infer the internal state that generates the
behavior.
Task Modules, Secondary Reward
and Reinforcement Learning
Multiple tasks that are ongoing simultaneously are a ubiqui-
tous characteristic of general human behavior and con-
sequently the brain has to be able to allocate resources
between them. This scheduling problem can be addressed
if there is a way of assigning value to the different tasks.
It has been demonstrated that external reward, in the form
of money or points in humans, and juice in monkeys, influ-
ences eye movements in a variety of experiments [1,24,25].
It remains to be established how to make the definitive
link between the primary rewards used in experimental
paradigms and the secondary rewards that operate in natu-
ral behavior, where eye movements are for the purpose of
acquiring information [1,11]. In principle, the neural reward
machinery provides an evaluation mechanism by which
gaze shifts can ultimately lead to primary reward, and thus
potentially allow us to understand the role that gaze patternsplay in achieving behavioral goals. A general consensus is
that this accounting is done by a secondary reward estimate,
and a huge amount of research implicates the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine in this role. It is now well established that
cells in many of the regions involved in saccade target selec-
tion and generation are sensitive to expectation of reward,
in addition to coding the movement itself [26–31]. The
challenge is to distill this experimental data into a more
formal explanation.
All natural tasks embody delayed rewards whereby deci-
sions made in the moment must anticipate future conse-
quences. The value of searching for a type of food must
include estimates of its nutritional value, as well as costs in
obtaining it. Furthermore, the value of a task at its initiation
can only reflect the expected ultimate reward, because
reward in the natural world is uncertain. Moreover, a conse-
quence of this uncertainty is that the initial evaluation needs
to be continually updated to reflect actual outcomes [32].
An important advance in this direction has been the develop-
ment of reinforcement learning models. Recent research
has shown that a large portion of the brain is involved in
representing different computational elements of reinforce-
ment learning models, and this provides a neural basis for
the application of such models to understanding sensory-
motor decisions [32–34]. Additionally, reinforcement learn-
ing has become increasingly important as a theory of how
simple behaviors may be learned [33], particularly as it
features a discounting mechanism that allows it to handle
the problem of delayed rewards.
A central attraction of such reinforcement learning models
for the study of eye movements is that they allow one to pre-
dict gaze choices by taking into account the learnt reward
value of those choices for the organism, providing a formal
basis for choosing fixations in terms of their expected value
to the particular task that they serve. However, reinforce-
ment learning has a central difficulty in that it does not
readily scale up to realistic natural behaviors. Fortunately
this problem can be addressed by making the simplifying
assumption that complex behaviors can be factored into
subsets of tasks served by modules that can operate
more or less independently [22]. Each independent module,
which can be defined as a Markov decision process, com-
putes a reward-weighted action recommendation for all
the points in its own state space, which is the set of values
the process can take. As the modules are all embedded
within a single agent, the action space is shared among all
modules and the best action is chosen depending on the
relative reward weights of the modules. The modules pro-
vide separate representations for the information needed
by individual tasks, and their actions influence state transi-
tions and rewards individually and independently. The
modular approach thus allows one to divide an impractically
large state space into smaller state spaces that can be
searched with conventional reinforcement learning algo-
rithms [35]. The factorization can potentially introduce state
combinations for which there is no consistent policy, but
experience shows that these combinations, for all practical
purposes, are very rare.
Expected Reward as a Module’s Fixation Protocol
The module formulation directly addresses the scheduling
problem in that it allows fixation choices to be understood
in terms of competing modules’ demands for reward. In
the driving scenario, where separate modules might
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Figure 1. Overall cognitive system model (1).
While driving, multiple independent modules
compete for gaze to improve their state
estimates (2). The winner, in this case Car
Following, uses a fixation to improve its
estimate of the followed car’s location. (3)
The driver’s action is selected according to
the policy learned through a Reinforcement
Learning (RL) algorithm. (4) The conse-
quences of action selection are computed
via the car simulator.
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R624address subtasks such as avoiding other cars, following a
leader car, staying in the lane, and so on, and specific infor-
mation is gathered from the visual image to support the
actions required for those tasks. The overall system is illus-
trated in Figure 1. In any realistic situation the state esti-
mates are subject to numerous sources of uncertainty, for
example degraded peripheral vision or visual memory
decay, which in turn confound reward estimates. At a given
moment the subject acquires a particular piece of
information for a module (for example, locates the nearest
car), takes an action (chooses avoidance path), and then
decides what module should get gaze next. When a partic-
ular module is updated with information from gaze, as
shown for Car following in Figure 1, the new sensory infor-
mation reduces uncertainty about the state of the environ-
ment relevant to that module (for example, location of an
obstacle). The next action is chosen on the basis of the map-
ping from states to actions, which may be learnt through
reinforcement. As a consequence of the action, for example
moving in a particular direction, the state of the world is
changed and the agent must decide which module’s state
should be updated next by gaze (highlighted in Figure 1).
The assumption is that fixation is a serial process where
one visual task accesses new information at each time
step, and all other tasks must rely on noisy memory
estimates.
The central hypothesis is that gaze deployment depends
on both reward and uncertainty. The gaze location chosen
is the one that reduces a module’s reward-weighted uncer-
tainty the most. This reward uncertainty protocol was devel-
oped by Sprague et al. [22] to simulate behavior in a walking
environment and was shown to be superior to the common
round-robin protocol used in robotics. Evidence that gaze
allocation inadynamic, noisy environment is in factcontrolled
by reduction of visual uncertainty weighted by subjective
reward value was obtained by Sullivan et al. [36]. This studytracked eyemovements of participants
in a simulateddriving taskwhereuncer-
tainty and implicit reward (via task pri-
ority) were varied. Participants were
instructed to follow a lead car at a spe-
cific distance and to drive at a specific
speed. Implicit rewardwas variedby in-
structing participants to emphasize
one taskover theother, anduncertainty
was varied by adding uniform noise to
the car’s velocity. Gaze measures,
including look proportion, duration
and interlook interval, showed that
drivers more closely monitor the
speedometer if it had a high level ofuncertainty, but only if it was also associated with high task
priority or implicit reward.
Modeling the Growth of Uncertainty
The data from Sullivan et al. [36] were thenmodeled by John-
son et al. [37] using an adaptation of the reward uncertainty
protocol to estimate the best reward and noise values for
each task directly from the gaze data. Because optimal
behavior for driving consisted of staying at fixed set points
in distance and speed, they were able to use the simplifica-
tion of a servo-controller for choosing the action, an approx-
imation that works well in this instance. The policy dictated
by reinforcement and the policy dictated by error-reducing
servo control are almost the same for these kinds of tropic
behaviors. Thus, for example, in both models, the driver
should speed up if the distance is greater than desired.
The growth in state space uncertainty in each module was
estimated using a stochastic diffusion model (cf [38]). In this
class of model, the growth of uncertainty about a particular
kind of information, such as speed, is simulated as a particle
executing a random walk until it exceeds some threshold
value. In each of the modules, the threshold models relative
task priority, with a lower threshold signifying greater impor-
tance or reward, and the drift rate represents the growth
of noise or uncertainty. As the module’s state estimate
approaches the threshold, the probability of triggering a
gaze change increases. The gaze change reduces the
respective module’s state variance, as would occur when a
subject gathers sensory data. Thus, lower thresholds and/
or higher noise values were more likely to trigger saccades
to update that module’s state. As in the Sprague et al. [22]
formulation, each task module depends on its own set of
world-state variables that are relevant to its specific task.
The model included three modules: one for following a car,
one for maintaining a constant speed; and a third for staying
in a lane. The relevant state variables were in the form of
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Figure 2. Evolution of state variable and un-
certainty information for three modules.
(A) Depiction of an update of the Follow mod-
ule. Starting in the initial state, the necessary
variables are known, but noise causes them
to drift. According to the model reward uncer-
tainty measurements, the Follow module is
selected for a gaze update. This improves its
state estimate while the other modules’ state
estimates drift further. (B) A progression of
state estimates for the three modules: con-
stant speed maintenance, leader following
and lane following. In each, the lines indicate
state estimate vs. time for that module’s rele-
vant variable, in scaled units. Thus, for the
Speed module, the y-axis depicts the car’s
velocity, for the Follow module it depicts the
distance to a setpoint behind the lead car,
and for the Lane module it shows the angle to
the closest lane center. If estimates overlap
into a single line, the module has low uncer-
tainty in its estimate. If estimatesdiverge,mak-
ing a ‘cloud’, the module has high uncertainty.
An update from the simulation for the Follow
module can be seen at ten seconds. The fixa-
tion, indicated by pale shaded rectangle, lasts
for 1.5 seconds. The figure shows how the
individual state estimates drift between looks
andhowthestatevariablesareupdatedduring
a look. The colored transparent region shows
the noise estimate for each module. (C) Top:
fixation on speedometer; bottom: fixation on
car. (Adapted from [37].)
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R625desired set points. The car-following task module used the
car’s deviation from a desired distance behind leader and
the difference between the agent’s heading and the angle
of this goal. The constant speed maintenance module used
the absolute speed of the car. Finally, the lane module
used the car’s angle to the nearest lane center. The driving
commands were chosen to reduce a weighted sum of errors
from each of these. The human subject’s three-dimensional
virtual driving world is simplified in the simulation as a two-
dimensional plane. The simulated world contains a single
road with two lanes similar to the one used by the human
drivers.
In a standard stochastic diffusion model, decisions are
made when the drifting state crosses a boundary threshold.
In contrast, in the ‘softmax’ version used in Johnson et al.
[37], themodel selection is probabilistic. Rather than a deter-
ministic decision, approaching a boundary increases the
bias towards selecting high priority modules and not select-
ing low priority ones. The probabilistic nature of selection,
however, means that low priority modules still have a non-
zero chance of selection, which provides needed flexibility
in capturing the variability of human fixation behavior.
Figure 2 summarizes features of the model simulations,
including a caricature of a typical heading update as well
as a typical segment of the performance of the three
modules’ boundary data and sensory update histories. The
model can predict the frequency histograms for fixation
durations on the lead car and the speedometer, and fits
human data remarkably well.
The driving model is not unique. Within the study of
behavior and eye movements in driving several control
models have been suggested for particular behaviors, for
example, car following or lane following [12,39]. Salvucci
and Taatgen [40,41] have also presented a ‘multithreadedtheory of cognition’ that is similar to the Sprague et al. [37]
scheduling model, in that it uses a modular structure; how-
ever, their simulation is more abstract and does not model
fine-grained fixation intervals. The framework also requires
many free parameters. The bottom line is that models that
treat the deployment of gaze as a sensory-motor arbitration
problem, embedded in a dynamic engagement with the envi-
ronment, have considerably more traction conceptually than
other approaches.
Bayesian Models for Interpreting Sequential Tasks
In the driving task, the modules were independent and
competing while executing in parallel. We now turn to a
different kind of situation, where modules are executed
sequentially, such as making a cup of tea or a sandwich.
This situation is more complex in that a more elaborate
model of the task itself is required in order to understand
the transition from one subtask to the next. For example, af-
ter picking up the knife when making a sandwich, the next
step might be ‘take the lid off the jelly’ or ‘put the bread on
the plate’. We need a model of the underlying task order
that keeps track of progress in order to predict the most
likely transition, and to interpret the role of any given fixation.
Land et al. [42] made an attempt to understand the task
structure in their seminal work on eye movements while
making tea. They postulated that tasks can be described
hierarchically, where the overall goal such as ‘make tea’ is
the highest level, and this is divided into sub-goals at lower
levels. At the lowest level they described object related
actions such as ‘remove the lid’ or ‘pick up the cup’ and sug-
gested that these were functional primitives. Accomplishing
one of these primitives typically involved several eye move-
ments, the function of which Land et al. [42] classified into
four types: locating, directing, guiding, and checking.
Peanut butter   on bread 
Jelly on bread
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Description
Put the bread onto the plate 
Take the lid off the peanut butter jar
Take the lid off the jelly jar
Pick up the knife
Spread the peanut butter on the bread
Spread the jelly on the bread
Put the peanut butter lid on
Put the jelly lid on
Put the knife on the table
Flip the bread to complete the sandwich
Figure 3. Recognized steps in peanut butter
and jelly sandwich making.
A computational model uses Bayesian evi-
dence pooling to pinpoint steps in the task
by observing the sandwich constructor’s
actions. The algorithm has access to the
central one degree of visual input centered
at the gaze point, which is delimited by the
crosshairs. Also the position and orientation
of each wrist is measured. The label in the
upper left is the algorithm’s estimate of the
stage in the task.
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structure of the task by inspection of a subject’s fixation
data, as in the case of tea making, ideally one would like a
more formal theoretical approach to understanding the un-
derlying structure that would allow us to understand the var-
iations from one time to the next as well as variations from
one subject to the next. The central issue revolves around
the fact that the brain has to organize the solution to the
task and, as a way station to ferreting out a satisfactory the-
ory, one would like to understand what kinds of information
are at least sufficient to predict task performance.
One helpful way to think about the problem is to charac-
terize the steps in the task, such as the ones that Land
et al. [42] posited, as part of a multidimensional probability
distribution that includes all the momentary sensorimotor
observations, as well as the steps that have been carried
out so far. If this information is available, then the current
subtask could be estimated as the most probable one after
integrating over all the other variables’ probability distri-
butions. Done directly, this integration process would be
very expensive, but it turns out thatmost of the task variables
are typically independent of each other and this allows the
integration over the dependencies that do occur to be
factored into inexpensive components.
Coding Probabilities in Dynamic Bayes Networks
An elegant way to represent sparsely factored probabilities
is to use a class ofMarkovmodels called dynamic Bayes net-
works [23]. Such networks can represent the probabilities
of states, with likelihoods coded in transitions between the
states. The structure is dynamic as the probabilistic book-
keeping extends in time. For example, in the case of making
a sandwich, we might treat a subtask goal such as ‘bread on
plate’ as a state, and the subsequent state as ‘lid off the pea-
nut butter jar’, and the transition between these states as
having some probability distribution depending on task fea-
tures, task context and time. Sandwich making has much
underlying regularity to its observed behavior [42–44],
and it’s possible to infer the underlying task structure very
accurately by incorporating the observable data, such as
the gaze location, hand position, hand orientation, and im-
age features as well as the prior sequence of states of the
task.Yi and Ballard [45] successfully
applied dynamic Bayes networks to
sandwich making. In a preparatory
step similar in spirit to the locating, di-
recting, guiding, and checking classifi-
cations of Land et al. [42], they grouped
the raw temporal data sequences intoa low-level language of elemental operations by painstak-
ingly annotating the videos of the sandwich makers. Thus,
picking up the knife — an object-related action in the termi-
nology of Land et al. [42] — could be coded as the sequence:
fixate knife/extract knife_location/put_hand knife_location/
pickup. This low-level annotation allowed the computer to
automatically recognize common subsequences from
different subjects and group them into the sub-tasks indi-
cated in Figure 3, even though the sub-tasks were done in
different orders by the different subjects. While there is
some arbitrariness in the video annotation, it proves suffi-
ciently robust for an algorithm to automatically recognize
the task steps. If these steps can be reliably recognized
given the data from the eye, and hand, and the state of the
scene, then we can have confidence that this is a valid model
of the task execution.
The dynamic Bayes network requires the statistics of sub-
task transitions, which can be gathered from subjects’ sand-
wich making data. As mentioned, at each point in time the
network factors the task probability function, exploiting
useful constraints, for example, ‘spread the peanut butter’
cannot occur prior to ‘pick up the knife’. Additional helpful
sets of constraints are also exploited, and those elaborate
the substructure of the task variables, such as subtask,
gaze location, image state and so on. The crucial depen-
dencies between these variables turn out to be very sparse,
providing great economies in the factorization of the overall
probability distribution. For example, a fixation classification
of ‘Jelly’ all but rules out the task of ‘spreading peanut
butter’.
Taking advantage of this sparseness of the interdepen-
dencies, Yi and Ballard’s [45] recognition model of sandwich
making used fixation and hand movement data in com-
bination with ongoing subtask identifications. The specific
dynamic Bayes model used to analyze the data was hand
engineered and is shown in Figure 4A. The model uses
ongoing measurements from a single subject in the course
of making the sandwich and attempts to report the correct
stages in the task. The conditional probabilities expressed
in the model are based on the statistics of observations
of human sandwich makers. To help understand how this
works, let us elaborate a low level component of the model
that relates the different possible gaze targets denoted
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Figure 4. Dynamic Bayes network details.
(A) The dynamic Bayes network model of hu-
man gaze factors the task variables and asso-
ciated conditionally independent variables
into a complex network. The network connec-
tivity dictates how peripheral information
can be propagated back to estimate the task
variables. Although peripheral estimates can
be very noisy, the task stages can be esti-
mated very reliably. Filled circles denote
measured data and open circles denote vari-
ables whose values must be computed.
Bayes rule governs the propagation process.
For example, the joint probability P(Gaze
Object, ClassifiedObject) can be factored
as P(Gaze_Object)P(ClassifiedObjectjGaze
Object). Bayes rule is then used to compute
the probability of the gaze object given a
measurement of the recognized object. Data
recorded from previous sandwich makers is
used to estimate the non-peripheral condi-
tional probabilities. Successive time intervals
are combined into a single ongoing task esti-
mate, which results in the labels displayed
in Figure 3. (B) The model classifies color
information from the fixation point into one
of the four classes of ClassifiedObject for
each interval, but the results are very noisy.
(C) The measurements for hand motion are
classified into Hand translating (e.g. reach-
ing), Hand rotating (e.g. screwing) for a frac-
tion of the temporal intervals associated with
stable gaze. Nonetheless, this information,
when combined with the visual classifications
and internal task priors, proves sufficient for
task estimation. (Adapted with permission
from [45]; copyright ª 2009 World Scientific
Publishing.)
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tem, which are denoted ‘ClassifiedObject’ and given by the
set {Nothing, Peanut butter, Jelly, Bread, Hand}. The bottom
two nodes and connecting arrow in the graph are the dy-
namic Bayes net notation for the probability factorization
P(GazeOject)P(ClassifiedObjectjGazeObject). Using Bayes
rule, this is proportional to the product P(GazeObjectjClassi-
fiedObject)P(ClassifiedObject), where the former can be
estimated from studying human sandwich makers and the
latter is unity for the result of the visual classifier. Once the
probability estimate for the GazeObject is determined, it
can be used to estimate the node above it in the network,
by the same procedure. Continuing in this fashion allows
the task label to be determined at each point in time.
Summarizing, dynamic Bayes networks are a way to
model possible underlying consistencies in state transitions,
and such a model can then be a repository for the perfor-
mance data of different subjects. Once the network has
been initialized in thisway, it can use its probability estimates
to track the performance of a new subject. Note that, as im-
plemented here, one can think of themodel as one held by an
observer watching the sandwich construction, but that with
relatively minor modifications, it could also be a model of
the sandwich constructor’s own mental process. Dynamic
Bayes networks are fast becoming a general tool for task
models; for example, the Itti laboratory [46,47] has extended
this approach to the more demanding pacing of video
games.The approach does not prove that dynamic Bayes formal-
isms are necessary, only that they are sufficient to account
for a large number of the data sets. Another limitation is
that if the task is changed, then they have to be modified
and re-trained. Another point to make is that, unlike the
driving example, the network model uses a more abstract
descriptive level, and does not address the individual fixation
statistics. However, despite these caveats, the ability of
these models to account for wide varieties of fixation data
makes them quite compelling.
Conclusions
Our understanding of the use of fixations in natural behavior
has undergone very rapid recent developments spurred on
by the rapid advances in wearable eye trackers. However,
the development of formal models has been difficult. The
most fundamental difficulty is to describe dynamic interac-
tion with the visual input. With the recent development of
new technology and computational formalisms, has it been
possible to resolve the issue of how generalizable the results
from a particular task model might be. The work reviewed
here shows how even such specific tasks as driving and
sandwich-making can be understood in quite general terms.
The critical feature of the approach is the decomposition
into subtasks. In the example of driving a car, gaze patterns
can be explained as competitions between these subtasks
for updating each task’s crucial state information. This sce-
nario is representative of any situation that can be modeled
Current Biology Vol 24 No 13
R628as a small collection of simultaneously ongoing tasks whose
sensory updating demands have to be multiplexed. To
handle this, modular reinforcement learning seems to have
the required additional structure because the individual
tasks can be learned, and also they provide the necessary
scaffolding for describing the competition for fixations.
The simulations described here show that they can ac-
count for the dynamics of fixations in multiplexed situations
and, to our knowledge, this is the first time this has been
done. Another aspect of the subtask decomposition occurs
when the subtasks represent sequential steps in carrying
out a complex task, such as making a sandwich. This ex-
ample allows the application of classes of graphical models
to represent the underlying task structure. Dynamic Bayes
networks can provide very good accounts of the use of
fixations in complicated dynamic scenarios that can be
seen as a succession of stages in a single overriding task,
and further the understanding of the role of specific fixations.
These two examples were selected as representative of
this new research avenue and are meant to show the con-
siderable promise of extending the understanding of the
use of fixations in complex natural behaviors. The focus of
the review has been on endogenous attentional control of
tasks, but a complete story has, in addition, to account for
exogenous stimuli that can change the agent’s agenda
[11]. As noted in the introduction, there is an extensive liter-
ature on exogenous attentional capture, but the task of satis-
factorily integrating them into a complete system remains.
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